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RECONSTRUCTING THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE AS AN ESCROW ACCOUNT 
Gregg D. Polsky* 
Introduction 
The recent health care reform law’s most controversial provision is the 
individual mandate, which imposes a fine on individuals who fail to obtain a 
minimum level of health insurance coverage. Many object to this policy, 
arguing that the government shouldn’t force individuals to purchase health 
insurance. Others believe that the mandate is a necessary component to 
health care reform. What has been missed in the discussion is that Congress 
could restructure the individual mandate to avoid the requirement that indi-
viduals purchase health insurance while still fulfilling its principal function.  
The principal purpose of the mandate is not to require individuals to 
purchase health insurance. Rather it is to prevent individuals from gaming a 
system that prevents insurers from excluding people with preexisting condi-
tions and from fully differentiating prices for those with different levels of 
health. Proponents of the health care law do not care very much whether 
someone chooses to insure against future health costs or to self-insure 
against those future costs. But they do worry that individuals who decide to 
self-insure will ultimately renege on this decision when they require signifi-
cant medical care. Self-insurers can renege either by not paying for medical 
services they receive or by buying into the insurance system after they have 
become sick.  
I. The Proposal 
Once it becomes clear that the primary purpose of the mandate is not to 
require individuals to purchase insurance but rather to protect against the 
failure of self-insurers to fully perform, a solution emerges. In many con-
texts when parties make important promises on which others rely, they are 
required to fund an escrow account or post a surety bond to ensure that they 
perform. If those parties fail to perform, these security devices compensate 
those who are harmed by the failure. Likewise, Congress could restructure 
the individual mandate as an escrow account. If an individual decided to 
self-insure against her future medical costs, then this proposed law would 
require her to make annual escrow contributions in the same amount as the 
penalty under the current mandate.  
                                                                                                                      
 * Willie Person Mangum Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
Thanks to Al Brophy, John Coyle, Brant Hellwig, Joan Krause, Andrew Lund, and Richard Saver for 
helpful conversations about this idea. 
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Once the individual fully performed, the federal government would re-
turn the contributed amounts, with interest at the market rate for lending 
money to the government. Ordinarily, full performance would be assured 
once the individual reached Medicare age. At that point, if the individual 
had remained out of the insurance pool and owed no outstanding medical 
bills, then the government would return her money. If an individual died 
before reaching Medicare age, then her estate would get the money back, so 
long as she had fully performed. 
Under this proposal, the government would use the money contributed 
to the escrow account in the same manner that the individual mandate reve-
nue is to be used. The right of the account holder to redemption upon full 
performance would therefore constitute an unfunded contingent obligation 
of the government to repay the contributions plus interest.  
By reconstructing the mandate as an escrow account, there would no 
longer be a financial penalty for self-insuring future medical costs. Because 
a performing self-insurer would receive the market rate of interest for lend-
ing to the government, she would be no worse off. While it is true that a 
self-insurer would effectively be forced to lend money to the government, 
the self-insurer could easily adjust a balanced investment portfolio to ac-
count for this by buying fewer U.S. debt securities. Some might object that 
those who lack sufficient liquidity would be unable to make the required 
escrow contributions. But those lacking sufficient liquidity to make the con-
tributions would surely be unable to effectively self-insure, because self-
insuring requires significant liquidity to pay for any medical emergencies 
that may arise. Furthermore, the health care reform law provides people 
with significant liquidity issues (i.e., poor and lower-middle class people) 
free insurance coverage or substantial subsidies to purchase insurance, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that they would elect to self-insure in the 
first place.  
Restructuring the mandate as an escrow account should be palatable to 
legislators who object to the government forcing people to buy health insur-
ance, but who favor opening up the insurance system to those with preexisting 
conditions. The escrow structure would allow people to choose to self-fund 
without penalty, while providing protection against those who try to game the 
system. Furthermore, reconstructing the mandate as an escrow account 
would be relatively simple to implement. Everything in the current health 
care law could remain the same, except that fully performing self-insurers 
would now be entitled to a refund of their penalties with interest. 
II. Possible Objections 
A. Too Many Healthy People Would Opt Out of Health Insurance 
By reconstructing the penalty as an escrow account, this proposal would 
appear to substantially reduce the cost of self-insuring. If it did, larger num-
bers of healthy people might choose to opt out of the insurance system, 
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which would diminish the average health level of the insurance pool, requir-
ing an increase in premiums to provide the same level of coverage.  
On first glance, it might appear that the proposal would substantially re-
duce the cost of choosing to self-insure. While a penalty is a sunk cost, the 
cost of funding the escrow account would be negligible. The only apparent 
cost would be that a self-insurer might be required to over-invest (relative to 
her preferences) in government debt; but as mentioned earlier, even this cost 
would be lower than it might appear because a self-insurer could adjust her 
portfolio to account for this forced investment. If this were in fact the only 
cost, then self-insuring would become significantly more attractive than it is  
under the current penalty regime.  
But the cost of choosing to self-insure under the escrow proposal is ac-
tually significantly larger than it might appear. Recall that to receive the 
escrow payout, the self-insurer must remain out of the insurance pool until 
the relevant date (i.e., either upon reaching Medicare age or upon dying, 
whichever happens first). Thus, only people who have a very high degree of 
confidence that they would want to remain out of the insurance pool until 
the relevant date might be influenced by the escrow proposal. Younger peo-
ple would have difficulty predicting both their future medical needs and the 
evolution of the health care market over several decades, so they would 
typically not be motivated by the proposal to opt out of the insurance mar-
ket. Older people, who face a much shorter “prediction horizon,” would 
typically not choose to opt out because buying insurance (in the reformed 
insurance market) would generally be a good deal for them after the new 
law is implemented. For example, the new health care law will prohibit in-
surers from price discrimination based on preexisting conditions, which 
older people are more likely to have. Additionally, the law prohibits insur-
ance companies from charging older people premiums that are higher than 
three times the amount charged to younger people; this aspect of the law 
does not fully reflect the additional health care costs of older people. In 
short, it is likely that relatively few people would be motivated to opt out of 
the insurance market as a result of reconstructing the individual mandate as 
an escrow account. 
B. It’s Too Complex 
Turning the mandate into an escrow account would add some adminis-
trative complexity because the government would have to issue refunds 
when self-insurers fully performed. But this marginal administrative burden 
would be minimal because, as discussed above, the number of self-insurers 
who actually performed through the relevant date would likely be very low. 
Where self-insurers failed to perform fully, the system would operate just 
like the current penalty regime, because the government would not be obli-
gated to repay the funds it had collected. Only in those cases where self-
insurers fully performed would refunds need to be processed. 
In addition, refund processing in these very few cases would not be es-
pecially onerous. When a self-insurer reached Medicare age, or if she died 
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before that date, in order to receive a refund, she (or her estate) would need 
to show that (i) she owed no outstanding medical bills, (ii) she had paid in 
full all of her previous medical bills, and (iii) she had never obtained insur-
ance coverage. The self-insurer would attest under penalties of perjury that 
she satisfied these requirements. The government could then substantiate 
these facts by making inquiries to credit reporting agencies and insurers. If the 
facts were verified, the government would issue a refund with interest, just 
like it does when taxpayers file claims for refunds for overpaid federal taxes. 
C. It Does Nearly Nothing 
The responses to the first two objections have essentially been that the 
proposal should operate, as a practical matter, almost exactly like the current 
individual mandate system. This similarity means that nearly the same num-
ber of people would opt into the insurance pool and that the marginal 
administrative burden of the proposed reform would be low. Given the simi-
larity, one might object to the proposal on the ground that it appears to do 
nothing or, at most, very little. 
Though the practical significance of the proposal would likely be mini-
mal, it still does serve an important purpose. This proposed reform clarifies 
that the government’s objective is not to require the purchase of health in-
surance but rather to open up the insurance market while preventing 
strategic behavior that undermines this goal. Under the proposal, the gov-
ernment would not punish those who wish to self-insure, but would prevent 
individuals from selectively participating in the insurance market only when 
they are ill. The fact that few would actually choose to self-insure under the 
proposal does not mean that the proposal would not be worthwhile. 
D. It Does Not Solve the Constitutional Problem 
Whether restructuring the mandate as an escrow account bolsters the ar-
gument that the health care law is constitutional is unclear. Those who feel 
that the Constitution forbids the federal government from penalizing the 
nonpurchase of health insurance might conclude that requiring an escrow 
contribution is likewise prohibited. Other skeptics of the current mandate 
may be swayed, believing that the absence of a financial punishment (in 
present value terms) is constitutionally significant.  
Regardless, the argument made here is a policy argument, not a constitu-
tional one. It is targeted at policymakers who like the idea of opening up the 
insurance market but are offended by the notion that the government is re-
quiring the purchase of health insurance. A pure constitutional solution (if 
one is necessary) is easy to envision, but it would not in any way address the 
concerns of those who object to the mandate on normative grounds. For ex-
ample, the mandate could easily be restructured as a tax credit for 
purchasing insurance. This could be accomplished by increasing the income 
tax liability of everyone through a 100 percent tax on the first specified 
amount of taxable income, and then giving a tax credit in the same amount 
POLSKY FI-FTP 1M.DOC 3/11/2011 9:48:33 AM 
March 2010] Reconstructing the Individual Mandate 77 
to everyone who purchases insurance. While this sort of restructuring would 
solve the constitutional problem, it would not ameliorate the concerns of 
those who object to the mandate on the ground that the government should 
not require the purchase of a health insurance plan. Reconstructing the man-
date as an escrow account, however, is responsive to this concern. 
Conclusion 
Turning the mandate into an escrow account would remove the financial 
penalty that would be imposed on self-insurers under the health care law. At 
the same time, it would protect the insurance system from the gamesman-
ship that would take place without a mandate or security device. 
Furthermore, changing the mandate to an escrow account would technically 
be very easy, as the practical effect of the change would be minimal. The 
entire health care law would remain the same, except that fully performing 
self-insurers would be entitled to a refund of their “penalties” with interest. 
